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a b s t r a c t 
Balancing the allocation of games in sports competitions is an important organizational task that can 
have serious financial consequences. In this paper, we examine data from 10,142 soccer games played in 
the top German, Spanish, French, and English soccer leagues between 20 07/20 08 and 2016/2017. Using 
a machine learning technique for variable selection and applying a semi-parametric analysis of radius 
matching on the propensity score, we find that all four leagues have a lower attendance in games that 
take place on four non-frequently played days than those on three frequently played days. We also find 
that, in all leagues, there is a significantly lower home advantage for the underdog teams on non-frequent 
days. Our findings suggest that the current schedule favors underdog teams with fewer home games on 
non-frequent days. Therefore, to increase the fairness of the competitions, it is necessary to adjust the 
allocation of the home games on non-frequent days in a way that eliminates any advantage driven by 
the schedule. These findings have implications for the stakeholders of the leagues, referees’ and calendar 
committees as well as for coaches and players. 
© 2020 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. 
























n  1. Introduction 
In recent decades, top European soccer leagues have become
large business corporations. Each of the top leagues receives more
than 1 billion Euros from television revenues alone. 1 A large part
of these amounts is redistributed to teams based on their perfor-
mance. In addition, the highest ranked teams of the top leagues
earn the right to participate in the UEFA Champions League and
Europa League. According to UEFA (the governing body of soccer
in Europe), in the 2016/2017 season, more than 1.3 billion Euros
was shared among the clubs in the Champions League and almost
400 million Euros among the clubs in the Europa League. 2 Since an
unbalanced schedule may have serious financial consequences, the✩ We would like to thank Michael Lechner, Ole Martin Kleivenes, Michael Knaus, 
Gabriel Okasa and Sandro Heiniger for helpful comments and suggestions. The usual 
discslaimer applies. 
∗ Corresponding authors. 
E-mail addresses: daniel.goller@unisg.ch (D. Goller), alex.krumer@himolde.no (A. 
Krumer). 
1 From https://www.euronews.com/2018/05/30/footbal- broadcast- rights- ligue- 
1- championship- booms- into- the- billion and https://www.soccerex.com/insight/ 
articles/2018/laliga- s- new- tv- rights- distribution- model- a- level- playing- field . Last 
accessed on 31.01.2019. 
2 From http://www.uefa.com/uefachampionsleague/news/newsid=2398575.html 
and http://www.uefa.com/uefaeuropaleague/news/newsid=2398584.html . Last 












0377-2217/© 2020 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article ueagues face an important organizational task in creating a sched-
le that will not discriminate against or favor specific teams. 
Top European soccer leagues use a double round-robin struc-
ure, where each team competes against each other team twice
uring the season. Operational research literature has intensively
nvestigated different issues of round-robin structures, such as bal-
nced distribution of home and away matches ( Della Croce &
liveri, 2006 ; Durán, Guajardo & Sauré, 2017 ), break optimiza-
ion ( Ribeiro & Urrutia, 2007 ), police requirements ( Kendall, Knust,
ibeiro & Urrutia, 2010 ), stakeholders’ requirements ( Goossens &
pieksma, 2009 ), minimizing traveling distance ( Durán, Durán,
arenco, Mascialino & Rey, 2019 ; Kendall, 2008 ), optimizing the
umber of prizes ( Krumer, Megidish & Sela, 2019 ), and allocation
f rescheduled games ( Yi, Goossens & Nobibon, 2020 ). 3 However,
he operational research literature has neglected another important
ssue: the allocation of (non-rescheduled) games between days
hat are not the usual days in a league’s calendar. This may play
n important role, because fans may have different preferences to-
ard certain days of the week ( Wang, Goossens & Vandebroek,
018 ) or even the timings of the game ( Krumer, 2020 ). For exam-
le, if fans are not used to attending games on a certain day, their3 See the comprehensive reviews of Rasmussen and Trick (2008) , Kendall et al. 
2010) , Goossens and Spieksma (2012) , and Van Bulck et al. (2020) for additional 
eferences. 
nder the CC BY license. ( http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ ) 





















































































































T  outine may prevent them from attending games on those days.
n such cases, lower attendance may be expected on these days,
hich may reduce the home advantage ( Downward & Jones, 2007 ;
evill, Balmer & Williams, 2002 ; Page & Page, 2010 ; Pettersson-
idbom & Priks, 2010 ). In the 2017/2018 season, for example, the
ecision to schedule Monday games in the German Bundesliga 1
ed to large protests. Moreover, German team 1.FSV Mainz 05 offi-
ially complained to the German Federation (DFL) since it had to
lay eight non-weekend games, six of which were at home. The
FL finally decided to abolish Monday games. 4 
The present paper is closely related to the study of Krumer
nd Lechner (2018) , who investigated games in the German Bun-
esliga 1 and found a significantly lower attendance and also a
ower home advantage in midweek days compared to weekend
ays (Friday, Saturday, Sunday − the most frequently played days
n this league). In other leagues, however, the three most frequent
ays, which account for approximately 90% of all matches, differ
rom those in Bundesliga 1. For example, in England and France,
he three most frequent days for games are Saturday, Sunday, and
ednesday, whereas the respective days in Spain are Saturday,
unday, and Monday. 5 
In this paper, we ask a simple question: Does playing on non-
requent days have any effect on the various aspects of soccer
ames? More specifically, using different definition of non-frequent
ays and applying data from the four above-mentioned European
occer leagues between 20 07/20 08 and 2016/2017, we compare the
ames that were played on frequent and on non-frequent days
ith regard to their attendance and home advantage. More specifi-
ally, unlike Krumer and Lechner (2018) , we separately investigated
ames with a home advantage for the favorite team and games
ith a home advantage for the underdog team. This is another
ontribution to the operational research literature, which has not
et considered the possibility of such a heterogeneous effect. 6 To
he best of our knowledge, the only paper to study such an effect
n a context of schedule is Krumer (2020) , which investigated the
EFA Europa League games with kick-off times at 19:00 CET and
1:05 CET. That paper documented a lower attendance in games
hat started at 21:05 CET and a significantly lower home advan-
age for the underdog teams in these later games. 
It is important to note that the allocation of the match days
s not entirely random, and might be based on different schedule-
elated features such as public holidays, international breaks, Eu-
opean tournaments, police requirements, broadcasters’ and clubs’
nterests, months of the year, and even teams’ values. Therefore,
e need to control for these deviations from random selection
nto treatment (that is, non-frequent days) using a selection-on-
bservables approach. Specifically, we estimated the average treat-
ent effect of playing on the non-frequent days by using the
istance-weighted radius matching approach with bias adjustment
uggested by Lechner, Miquel and Wunsch (2011) . This estimator
s constructed to be more robust than other matching-type esti-
ators, as it combines the features of distance-weighted radius
atching with a bias adjustment to remove sample biases due to
ismatches ( Huber, Lechner & Wunsch, 2013 ). In addition, having
 rich database in terms of potential confounding variables, we use4 For additional information, see: https://www.mainz05.de/news/ 
rief- an- die- dfl- kritik- an- terminierungen/ (in German) and https://www.dw. 
om/en/bundesliga- monday- games- to- be- discontinued- as- fan- protests- persist/ 
-46390559 . Last accessed on 03.11.2019. 
5 According to the UEFA association club coefficients, these are four of the five 
ost successful leagues in Europe. We do not use data on the fifth (the Italian Se- 
ie A) since it suffered from various scandals and club insolvencies in the under- 
ying period. See, for example, Buraimo, Migali and Simmons (2016) , who found a 
ignificantly lower crowd attendance after the Calcipoli scandal in the 20 05/20 06. 









 machine learning technique for variable selection as proposed by
elloni, Chernozhukov and Hansen (2014) . 
Based on analysis of 10,142 games from the top four European
eagues over 10 seasons, we found a significantly lower attendance
n four non-frequent days in all four leagues. In addition, all of
he leagues had a reduced home advantage on four non-frequent
ays for the underdog teams, which is in line with Krumer (2020) .
ur results suggest that the difference in the number of points be-
ween the favorite and the underdog teams, when the game takes
lace on non-frequent days compared to frequent days, is 0.49 in
igue 1, 0.43 in La Liga, 0.42 in the Premier League, and 0.63 in
undesliga 1. To put these numbers into perspective, a favorite
ith home advantage gains about 1.1 points more than the under-
og, on average. 7 , 8 
Such a reduced home advantage for weaker teams in games
ith a lower attendance is in line with the literature on the ef-
ect of the density of the crowd and its noise on referees’ bias
n favor of the home team. For example, using laboratory settings,
evill et al. (2002) determined that crowd noise had a significant
ffect on the probability of a referee issuing a yellow card against
 home team. Downward and Jones (2007) showed a positive re-
ationship between the size of the crowd and the likelihood of
 player receiving a yellow card in the English FA Cup. Similarly,
ettersson-Lidbom and Priks (2010) found a significant home bias
f referees in games in which spectators were present compared
o games with no spectators at all in the Italian Serie A. In addi-
ion, Ponzo and Scoppa (2018) showed a significantly larger num-
er of cards against away teams in Serie A games between the
eams from the same city that shared the same stadium. Finally,
age and Page (2010) found that the home advantage effect differs
ignificantly among referees, and that this relationship is moder-
ted by the size of the crowd. Therefore, a possible mediator of
he difference in the home advantage of the underdog teams in
ames that take place on non-frequent days is lower crowd noise
ompared to games on frequent days. 9 
However, except for the case of Bundesliga 1, whose favorite
eams that played at home suffer from the highest reduction of
he crowd on non-frequent days (almost 16% smaller crowds), we
ound no difference in home advantage between different days
hen favorite teams play at home. As Krumer (2020) proposed, it
s possible that the underdog teams depends more on crowd sup-
ort or even pre-performance routine than the favorite teams be-
ause the latter are likely to win due to their higher ability regard-
ess of home support or some other psychological factors. There-
ore, underdog teams seem to lose more points in games with
ower crowd density compared to the favorite teams. 
Our results suggest that since some underdog teams play more
ome games on non-frequent days than other underdog teams, the
urrent structure favors underdogs that play fewer home games
n non-frequent days and favorites that play more away games on
on-frequent days. To illustrate a possible relationship between an
nbalanced schedule and the resulting monetary rewards, Krumer
nd Lechner (2018) gave an example of SC Paderborn 07 , which
as relegated from the Bundesliga 1 in the 2014/2015 season.
his team played more home games on non-frequent days than its7 Note that the winning team receives three points, while the losing team gets 
o points. In case of a draw, each team gets one point. 
8 We also investigated the effect of playing on the two most frequent days, which 
re always Saturday and Sunday versus five non-frequent days (5/2 days split). We 
ound that the third most frequent day is more similar to weekend games than to 
he other midweek games confirming our choice to refer to the 4/3 days split as to 
ur preferred specification. For additional details, see the results section. 
9 One additional explanation may be related to the usual pre-performance rou- 
ine that has been found to be positively associated with performance in sports 
see, for example, Lonsdale and Tam, 2008 , and Mesagno and Mullane-Grant, 2010 ). 
e discuss this possibility in the results section. 
























































Frequency of matches by days. 
Weekday Ligue 1 La Liga Premier League Bundesliga 
Monday 11 199 204 1 
Tuesday 57 71 182 72 
Wednesday 251 185 287 96 
Thursday 14 70 26 3 
Friday 186 140 30 275 
Saturday 2188 1285 2152 1994 
Sunday 1093 1850 919 619 
Notes: The total numbers of matches on the specific weekdays, includ- 
ing matches that were excluded from the final analysis. Bold numbers 









































10 Prior to 2016/17, the three bottom-ranked teams were directly relegated to the 
lower division. 
11 The relegation playoff format was introduced in the 20 08/20 09 season. Prior to 
that, three teams were directly relegated to the Bundesliga 2. closest rival until the very last game in the relegation fight, Ham-
burger SV , which eventually remained in the top division. More-
over, one of these games was against Hamburger SV , which the lat-
ter won. According to Krumer and Lechner (2018) , if SC Paderborn
07 had survived in the Bundesliga 1, its additional revenue from TV
alone would have been at least 10.3 million Euros (not counting all
other revenues from ticketing, advertising, and so on). 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.
Section 2 describes the schedule of the different leagues. The
data and some descriptive results are presented in Section 3 .
Section 4 presents the empirical strategy. The results are con-
tained in Section 5 and we offer concluding remarks in Section 6 . 
2. Description of the leagues’ schedules 
2.1. General structure of the leagues 
While there are specific features for different leagues, the struc-
ture of all four leagues we investigate is largely similar. The leagues
are organized as double round-robin tournaments, with each round
consisting of n 2 games, where n is the number of teams in the
league. In total, each team plays each other team twice, once at
its home field in the first half of the season, and once away in
the second half of the season (or vice versa). In total, every team
has 2( n − 1 ) games. In the French, Spanish, and English leagues,
there are 20 teams, resulting in 38 games for each team. In the
German Bundesliga 1, there are 18 teams, resulting in 34 games
for each team. In addition, except for the English Premier League,
the leagues have a winter break of several weeks without games. 
The schedule of the leagues should also take into account in-
ternational tournaments between nations, with the requirement to
release participating players earlier and allow them a longer vaca-
tion. The main tournaments are the FIFA World Cup and the UEFA
European Championship (held alternately every two years in June
and July). Other tournaments that have the requirement to release
players are the African Cup of Nations and the Asian Cup. Those
take place during wintertime in parallel to the European leagues’
matches. 
League games usually take place on weekends, but since there
are not enough weekends in the season, some rounds take place
on other days. 
At the end of a season, the final table determines which teams
participate in the following season’s European club tournaments;
these include the Champions League, which is the most presti-
gious club tournament in Europe, and the Europa League, which
also yields significant monetary rewards. In addition, the two or
three worst-ranked clubs are relegated to the second division, im-
plying that the different outcomes have substantial financial con-
sequences for the clubs. 
Following Krumer and Lechner (2018) , who investigated the ef-
fect of playing on Fridays, Saturdays, and Sundays (the three most
frequently played days in the Bundesliga 1), we identified the three
most frequently played days separately for each league, as depicted
in Table 1 . Although less pronounced than in the Bundesliga 1, the
three most frequent days for Ligue 1 and Premier League are quite
clear. For the La Liga, however, the reduction in frequency between
the third and fourth days is less significant. We follow the choice
of Krumer and Lechner (2018) by taking the three most frequent
days and need the remaining four days, which are defined as non-
frequent, to have enough observations. Nevertheless, we will also
investigate the effect of playing on the two most frequent days,
which are always Saturday and Sunday, and compare between the
results by discussing whether the third most frequent day is more
similar to weekend games or to the other midweek games. In the
following, we discuss special settings and uniqueness of schedule
of the games that are described below for each league separately. .2. The French Ligue 1 
The three most frequently played match days are Saturday, Sun-
ay, and Wednesday. The seasonal tournament in France takes
lace from August to the beginning of May. The top three teams
dvance to the Champions League (or for the Champions League
layoffs). Teams in the fourth to sixth positions play in the Eu-
opa League (this may also depend on the outcome of an elimina-
ion French Cup tournament, called the Coupe de France ). In addi-
ion, the two worst-ranked clubs are relegated to the lower divi-
ion and the 18th-ranked team has to participate in a relegation
layoff against the team that won the second division playoff for
he right to play in the Ligue 1 in the following year. 10 
.3. The Spanish La Liga 
The three most frequently played match days are Saturday, Sun-
ay, and Monday. The seasonal tournament in Spain runs from the
nd of August or beginning of September until May of the follow-
ng year. The top four teams advance to the Champions League (or
he playoffs). Teams finishing fifth to seventh play in the Europa
eague (this may also depend on the outcome of an elimination
panish Cup tournament, called the Copa del Rey ). In addition, the
hree worst-ranked clubs are relegated to the lower division. 
.4. The German Bundesliga 1 
The three most frequently played match days are Saturday, Sun-
ay, and Friday. The seasonal tournament in Germany takes place
rom August to May. The top four teams advance to the Champions
eague (or to the playoffs). Teams finishing fifth to seventh play in
he Europa League (this may also depend on the outcome of an
limination German Cup tournament, called the DFB-Pokal ). In ad-
ition, the two worst-ranked clubs are relegated to the lower divi-
ion and the 16th-ranked team must participate in the relegation
layoffs against the third-ranked team in the Bundesliga 2 for the
ight to play in the Bundesliga 1 in the following year. 11 
.5. The English Premier League 
The three most frequently played match days are Saturday, Sun-
ay, and Wednesday. The seasonal tournament in England takes
lace from August until May. This is the only one of the four
eagues discussed here that does not have a long winter break.
everal rounds take place during the Christmas holidays, usually
nvolving local derbies to avoid fans having to travel long distances
n those days ( Kendall, 2008 ). The best-known round takes place










































































































(  n Boxing Day, which is a part of the Commonwealth tradition. We
xpect this to play a role in the scheduling process in the under-
ying period and account for this issue, as described in the next
ection. 
The top four teams advance to the Champions League (or
he playoffs). Teams finishing fifth to seventh play in the Europa
eague (this may also depend on the outcome of two elimination
nglish Cup tournaments: the FA Cup and the League Cup). In ad-
ition, the three worst-ranked clubs are relegated to the lower di-
ision. 
Compared to the other three leagues, the Premier League has
he highest amount of rescheduled games, because its clubs poten-
ially have the highest number of games to play in their national
ups (the FA Cup and the League Cup). The reason for this is that,
n most stages of these competitions, a drawn match necessitated
 repeated second game. 12 This partly interfered with the initial
chedule proposed by the calendar committee. 
. Data and descriptive results 
.1. Database 
We used data on four major European football leagues: the
rench Ligue 1, German Bundesliga 1, the Spanish La Liga, and the
nglish Premier League. 13 For each of the leagues, we collected
ata on all the games starting from the start of the 20 07/20 08
eason until the end of the 2016/2017 season. This represents a
otal of 14,460 games. However, we disregarded games in which
 home team did not play at its usual home stadium. For exam-
le, Bayer Leverkusen from Germany did not play the second half
f the 20 08/20 09 season at its home stadium due to reconstruc-
ion. RC Lens from France experienced a similar situation in the
014/2015 season. In addition, Montpellier, Caen (both 2014/2015),
nd Lille (20 07/20 08 and 20 08/20 09) from France played some
ome games in alternative stadiums. We also removed matches in
hich one of the teams had already been relegated or had already
on the championship title. 14 In addition, teams that play in the
hampions League or Europa League may strategically adjust their
quads in the domestic leagues games that take place just before
r after the European cups (for example, they may save their best
layers before the European games to avoid a risk of injury or let
hem rest after). Therefore, we also removed games that involved
eams playing just before or just after the continental competi-
ions. 15 Finally, we also removed rescheduled games, since those
ay differ with regard to media attention as they are detached
rom the rest of the matches. 16 Removing those games left 10,142
atches, 9010 of which took place on frequent days and 1132 on
on-frequent days. 
For every game, we collected information on the identity of
eams, referees, exact day, attendance, distance between the cities,
nd the final score. We also used data from the Transfermarkt web-
ite to proxy the market value of each player of each team in every
eason. This data also includes personal information of each player,
uch as his age, height, and preferred foot. Finally, we have data on12 In the case of a draw after the second game, overtime is played and, if needed, 
enalty shootouts determine the winner. 
13 See Appendix C for the full list of sources. 
14 For example, in 2013/2014 season Bayern Munich from Germany had won the 
undesliga 1 title after 27 rounds. However, in the next three games they only 
ained one point out of nine and were accused of lacking motivation. See Kendall 
nd Lenten (2017) for additional discussion on the usage of squads in remaining 
ames after winning a title. 
15 See Rohde and Breuer (2017) , who showed that teams adjust their effort s in 
omestic league just before or after games in European tournaments. 











he dates of the beginning and the end of each coach’s tenure, as
ell as data on the capacity of each stadium. 
.2. Definition of heterogeneity 
There can be different types of heterogeneity in sports com-
etition, such as home versus away or the favorite versus un-
erdog teams. 17 We choose the favorite-underdog type of hetero-
eneity because it is intuitive that probabilities of winning (or
he expected number of points) are largely driven by the differ-
nces in the teams’ abilities, whereas the home-away factor plays
 secondary role in increasing or decreasing the gap between the
eams’ probabilities of winning. While home advantage is a well-
stablished phenomenon, the literature has largely neglected the
eterogeneous effect for favorites versus underdogs. More impor-
antly, beyond the above-mentioned intuition, standard economic
heory predicts probabilities of winning based on contestants’ in-
ate abilities. For example, the Tullock contest ( Tullock, 1980 ) is
 well-known model in economic theory that has been applied in
any fields, from political races (e.g. Klumpp & Polborn, 2006 ) to
ports tournaments (e.g., Szymanski, 2003 ). The most popular ver-
ions of this model are lottery and all-pay contest. In the lottery
ersion, a contestant with a lower effort still has a positive proba-
ility of winning, whereas an all-pay contest is fully discriminatory,
here a contestant with a lower effort is certain to lose. 
Now, assume a contest between two heterogeneous contestants
 and 2, whose values (or the ability types) are V 1 > V 2 , imply-
ng that contestant 1 is a stronger (or a higher-ranked) contes-
ant. In the lottery model, contestants’ efforts ( x i ) are given by




( V 1 + V 2 ) 2 




( V 1 + V 2 ) 2 
, and their probabilities of winning
 p i ) are given by p 1 = V 1 V 1 + V 2 and p 2 = 
V 2 
V 1 + V 2 . In the all-pay case,
ontestants’ efforts are given by x 1 = V 2 2 , and x 2 = 
V 2 
2 
2 V 1 
, and their
robabilities of winning are given by p 1 = 1 − V 2 2 V 1 and p 2 = 
V 2 
2 V 1 
. 18 
e can see that these probabilities are derived from contestants’
bility types. 19 Therefore, the favorite-underdog type of hetero-
eneity is the one that fits the economic theory when investigating
robabilities of winning (or the number of the gained points per
ame, in the case of soccer). 
.3. Variables and descriptive statistics 
To estimate the effect of playing on non-frequent days on atten-
ance and the number of gained points by the teams, we coded a
ummy variable that equals 1 if a match was played on a non-
requent day in a certain league, and zero otherwise. We also
sed a rich set of variables that characterize team value and play-
rs’ ability, game attendance, and the international and national
chedule. In the following, we present some of the most impor-
ant measures (a more comprehensive list of variables appears in
ppendix A ). 
Our approach is closely related to that of Krumer and Lechner
2018) . Following their study, we used data on players’ values from17 Other types of heterogeneities might be found in teams that replaced their 
oach, matches played on artificial versus natural grass, televised versus non- 
elevised matches, traditional rivalry versus non-rivalry matches, etc. 
18 For the lottery case, see, for example, Megidish and Sela (2014) , who studied 
wo-stage contests that are frequently used in sports competitions. For the all-pay 
ase, see, for example, Krumer and Lechner (2017) , who showed that in six out of 
even possible cases in Olympic wrestling competitions, the all-pay model predicted 
orrectly the identity of a wrestler with a higher probability of winning. 
19 Note that those probabilities can be easily adjusted for the home advantage. 
ee, for example, Krumer (2013) who provided a theoretical explanation to empir- 
cal finding of Page and Page (2007) on second-leg home advantage in the UEFA 
uropean Cups, by using the all-pay model adjusted by home and away games. 
744 D. Goller and A. Krumer / European Journal of Operational Research 286 (2020) 740–754 
Table 2 
Descriptive statistics of the main variables. 
Favorite playing home Underdog playing home 
Variable Frequent days Non-frequent days Frequent days Non-frequent days 
Game Outcomes 
Favorite points 1.930 (1.249) 1.981 (1.245) 1.333 (1.292) 1.575 (1.298) 
Underdog points 0.817 (1.131) 0.784 (1.126) 1.391 (1.298) 1.144 (1.251) 
Favorite win 0.559 0.582 0.352 0.432 
Underdog win 0.188 0.183 0.371 0.288 
Game Characteristics 
Visitors 32,743 (17,533) 34,583 (18,871) 24,031 (12,640) 24,943 (12,584) 
Stadium capacity 40,825 (17,510) 44,864 (19,521) 29,924 (12,974) 31,410 (13,588) 
Share of capacity 0.781 (0.192) 0.750 (0.201) 0.792 (0.183) 0.794 (0.176) 
Ln(Attendance) 10.242 (0.584) 10.292 (0.604) 9.955 (0.529) 10.005 (0.497) 
Distance (in kilometer) 487.5 (341.8) 501.6 (364.6) 485.1 (337.8) 461.5 (402.3) 
Teams Characteristics 
Fav. standardized team value 0.218 (1.009) 0.464 (1.143) 0.228 (1.007) 0.510 (1.198) 
Und. standardized team value −0.577 (0.352) −0.508 (0.333) −0.570 (0.357) −0.515 (0.391) 
Fav. ratio of top 3 to ranked 9 −11 most valuable players 2.410 (0.713) 2.492 (0.826) 2.408 (0.727) 2.469 (0.737) 
Und. ratio of top 3 to ranked 9 −11 most valuable players 2.330 (0.750) 2.403 (0.815) 2.332 (0.753) 2.381 (0.754) 
Fav. plays in Europa League or Champions League 0.331 0.455 0.340 0.440 
Und. plays in Europa League or Champions League 0.086 0.127 0.084 0.108 
Schedule-related 
African Cup of Nations 0.066 0.023 0.066 0.037 
Asian Cup 0.022 0.009 0.021 0.007 
Public holiday 0.035 0.091 0.035 0.091 
2 months before UEFA European Championship 0.064 0.084 0.063 0.073 
2 months after UEFA European Championship 0.042 0.065 0.041 0.048 
2 months before FIFA World Cup 0.040 0.039 0.044 0.027 
2 months after FIFA World Cup 0.028 0.049 0.028 0.044 
Observations 4462 569 4548 563 
Notes: This table presents average values and standard deviations (in parentheses for non-binary variables) for the three most frequent and four 

















































a popular soccer website, Transfermarkt, which are supposed to re-
flect teams’ abilities. Since these values increase every season, we
standardized them for each league and season so that they take
the within-season variation into account. 20 The teams’ values mea-
sure strongly correlates with teams’ performance, suggesting that
we have measured teams’ abilities quite well. 21 For each game,
the favorite is defined as the team with the higher standardized
Transfermarkt value and the underdog is the team with the lower
standardized Transfermarkt value. Unlike with betting odds, where
favorite and underdog can be a function of the day of the week
and the home advantage, the Transfermarkt values are determined
without considering those factors. Therefore, these definitions are
exogenous. 
Following Krumer (2020) , we divided the data into games that
take place at the favorite’s and the underdog’s home fields. In
Table 2 , which presents descriptive statistics for the pooled data,
we can see that when a favorite plays at its home stadium, the
average number of points it gains on frequent days is 1.93. When
the game is on a non-frequent day, the favorite team gains a very
similar number of points (1.98). However, when an underdog team
hosts the game, it gains an average of 1.39 points on frequent days
and 1.14 points on non-frequent days, suggesting a lower home ad-
vantage on non-frequent days for the underdog teams only. 
Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics divided into four dif-
ferent leagues, where we can see a similar pattern. However, we20 According to Bryson, Frick and Simmons (2013) , the coverage of Transfermarkt 
is quite “impressive with information on 190,0 0 0 players across 330 football com- 
petitions” (p. 611). Players’ values are estimated by industry experts and take 
into account salaries, signing fees, bonuses, and transfer fees. Franck and Nüesch 
(2012) found that the correlation between values evaluated by Transfermarkt and 
Kicker , another highly-respected sport magazine in Germany, is as high as 0.89. 







lso observe that when an underdog team plays at home, in all
eagues except La Liga, there are much stronger favorites on non-
requent days compared to frequent days. The direction is the same
n La Liga, but the difference between standardized values of fa-
orites on frequent and non-frequent days is less pronounced. This
escriptive evidence indicates that there is non-random selection
nto treatment; that is, non-frequent days. We will discuss how to
olve this issue in the next section. 
The players’ values are used to create additional measures such
s the distribution of values between and within teams. More
pecifically, for each team we compute the standard deviation
f players’ values − the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) − which
s defined as the sum of the squares of the values shares of
ach player within the team. We also created other within-team
nequality-related variables such as the ratio of different players’
alues according to their ranking order in the team. For example,
ne measure is the ratio between the top three players to players
anked 9 −11 according to their values within a team. 22 In addition
o players’ values, we also use several other variables that may re-
ect the level of ability, such as a dummy variable for a team’s first
eason in the top division after being promoted from the lower di-
ision, whether a team dismissed its coach during a season, and
he age of the coach. 23 We also use data on the size of the squad,
hare of foreign players in the squad, height of the players, share
f left-footed players, age of oldest/youngest players, etc. 
Based on the large body of the literature on the effect that the
rowd has on home advantage, we created a measure to reflect
he attendance in a match. Our first measure − attendance as share22 See Coates, Frick, and Jewell (2016) for discussion on the relationship between 
layers’ inequality in salaries and teams’ performance. 
23 See Tena and Forrest (2007) , and Flores, Forrest, and Tena (2012) for discussions 
n the effects of coach dismissals on team performance. 
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Table 3 
Descriptive statistics of the main variables for each league separately. 
Favorite playing home Underdog playing home 
Variable Frequent days Non-frequent days Frequent days Non-frequent days 
Ligue 1 
Favorite points 1.905 (1.229) 1.901 (1.221) 1.309 (1.286) 1.685 (1.266) 
Underdog points 0.807 (1.093) 0.793 (1.071) 1.410 (1.297) 1.000 (1.177) 
Share of capacity 0.649 (0.183) 0.634 (0.210) 0.691 (0.178) 0.728 (0.181) 
Ln(Attendance) 9.859 (0.566) 10.052 (0.592) 9.604 (0.444) 9.821 (0.408) 
Distance (in kilometer) 657.2 (335.3) 662.1 (308.0) 658.8 (331.0) 608.2 (339.2) 
Fav. standardized team value 0.310 (1.102) 0.769 (1.313) 0.303 (1.087) 1.127 (1.519) 
Und. standardized team value −0.542 (0.357) −0.405 (0.286) −0.535 (0.367) −0.426 (0.241) 
Fav. ratio of top 3 to ranked 9 −11 most valuable players 2.388 (0.779) 2.754 (1.183) 2.406 (0.823) 2.508 (0.855) 
Und. ratio of top 3 to ranked 9 −11 most valuable players 2.303 (0.756) 2.329 (0.695) 2.297 (0.751) 2.277 (0.556) 
Fav. plays in Europa League or Champions League 0.273 0.378 0.293 0.293 
Und. plays in Europa League or Champions League 0.079 0.108 0.074 0.054 
African Cup of Nations 0.060 0.036 0.050 0.043 
Public holiday 0.032 0.054 0.026 0.022 
Weekdays Wed, Sat, Sun Mon, Tue, Thu, Fri Wed, Sat, Sun Mon, Tue, Thu, Fri 
Observations 1365 111 1397 92 
La Liga 
Favorite points 2.005 (1.249) 2.071 (1.227) 1.307 (1.300) 1.446 (1.281) 
Underdog points 0.777 (1.137) 0.717 (1.103) 1.432 (1.313) 1.246 (1.256) 
Share of capacity 0.698 (0.169) 0.651 (0.160) 0.703 (0.178) 0.680 (0.165) 
Ln(Attendance) 10.154 (0.610) 10.077 (0.636) 9.763 (0.477) 9.722 (0.481) 
Distance (in kilometer) 631.2 (401.2) 659.0 (407.2) 621.5 (389.1) 688.2 (503.8) 
Fav. standardized team value 0.193 (1.010) 0.234 (1.073) 0.190 (1.012) 0.224 (1.077) 
Und. standardized team value −0.520 (0.257) −0.499 (0.237) −0.518 (0.246) −0.510 (0.231) 
Fav. ratio of top 3 to ranked 9 −11 most valuable players 2.614 (0.779) 2.630 (0.809) 2.604 (0.779) 2.624 (0.840) 
Und. ratio of top 3 to ranked 9 −11 most valuable players 2.450 (0.822) 2.525 (0.903) 2.457 (0.827) 2.522 (0.886) 
Fav. plays in Europa League or Champions League 0.328 0.381 0.323 0.390 
Und. plays in Europa League or Champions League 0.087 0.115 0.083 0.092 
African Cup of Nations 0.074 0.000 0.087 0.015 
Public holiday 0.043 0.013 0.045 0.015 
Weekdays Mon, Sat, Sun Tue, Wed, Thu, Fri Mon, Sat, Sun Tue, Wed, Thu, Fri 
Observations 1078 226 1105 195 
Premier League 
Favorite points 1.968 (1.244) 2.033 (1.216) 1.389 (1.289) 1.600 (1.292) 
Underdog points 0.790 (1.124) 0.719 (1.073) 1.322 (1.281) 1.111 (1.236) 
Share of capacity 0.927 (0.085) 0.936 (0.083) 0.913 (0.091) 0.906 (0.095) 
Ln(Attendance) 10.486 (0.364) 10.599 (0.372) 10.199 (0.318) 10.205 (0.357) 
Distance (in kilometer) 235.8 (132.7) 203.3 (131.2) 233.6 (133.2) 208.0 (126.8) 
Fav. standardized team value 0.213 (0.990) 0.542 (0.998) 0.246 (0.984) 0.552 (1.099) 
Und. standardized team value −0.654 (0.409) −0.596 (0.412) −0.636 (0.419) −0.562 (0.549) 
Fav. ratio of top 3 to ranked 9 −11 most valuable players 2.200 (0.514) 2.223 (0.473) 2.201 (0.512) 2.210 (0.484) 
Und. ratio of top 3 to ranked 9 −11 most valuable players 2.336 (0.737) 2.336 (0.813) 2.326 (0.734) 2.383 (0.756) 
Fav. plays in Europa League or Champions League 0.385 0.516 0.398 0.511 
Und. plays in Europa League or Champions League 0.093 0.137 0.099 0.153 
African Cup of Nations 0.060 0.059 0.060 0.074 
Public holiday 0.039 0.281 0.044 0.242 
Weekdays Wed, Sat, Sun Mon, Tue, Thu, Fri Wed, Sat, Sun Mon, Tue, Thu, Fri 
Observations 1111 153 1124 190 
Bundesliga 1 
Favorite points 1.833 (1.279) 1.734 (1.365) 1.331 (1.295) 1.698 (1.381) 
Underdog points 0.914 (1.184) 1.089 (1.322) 1.396 (1.302) 1.140 (1.347) 
Share of capacity 0.898 (0.115) 0.837 (0.144) 0.902 (0.125) 0.880 (0.133) 
Ln(Attendance) 10.624 (0.378) 10.645 (0.448) 10.416 (0.414) 10.401 (0.420) 
Distance (in kilometer) 369.8 (183.1) 403.3 (171.7) 365.0 (185.4) 350.4 (185.2) 
Fav. standardized team value 0.116 (0.865) 0.543 (1.231) 0.139 (0.891) 0.406 (1.036) 
Und. standardized team value −0.604 (0.345) −0.512 (0.411) −0.603 (0.357) −0.517 (0.377) 
Fav. ratio of top 3 to ranked 9 −11 most valuable players 2.457 (0.661) 2.254 (0.566) 2.428 (0.661) 2.648 (0.662) 
Und. ratio of top 3 to ranked 9 −11 most valuable players 2.222 (0.641) 2.291 (0.667) 2.243 (0.661) 2.168 (0.511) 
Fav. plays in Europa League or Champions League 0.352 0.658 0.360 0.558 
Und. plays in Europa League or Champions League 0.087 0.165 0.084 0.105 
African Cup of Nations 0.072 0.000 0.073 0.000 
Public holiday 0.024 0.000 0.027 0.000 
Weekdays Fri, Sat, Sun Mon, Tue, Wed, Thu Fri, Sat, Sun Mon, Tue, Wed, Thu 
Observations 908 79 922 86 
Notes: This table presents average values and standard errors (in parentheses for non-binary variables) for the main variables for each league separately. 
For each league, we also provide the used frequent and non-frequent weekdays. 















































































































25 of the capacity of the stadium − is the ratio between the number
of viewers in a match and the maximal possible capacity of the
respective stadium. We also applied a different measure of atten-
dance, namely a natural logarithm of attendance ( Ln(Attendance))
that is also used in the literature on attendance demand ( Buraimo
& Simmons, 2015 ; Buraimo, Tena & de la Piedra, 2018 ; Krumer,
2020 ) . In addition, following the studies of Boyko, Boyko and
Boyko (2007) and Page and Page (2010) , who described the ex-
istence of individual differences among referees in terms of the
home advantage in different soccer leagues, we created dummy
variables for each individual referee in our data. Further, there is
also information about the distance between cities, in kilometers
for the shortest traveling distance. 
We also obtained information on other schedule-related vari-
ables in international competitions, such as two pre- and post-
orld Cup and European Championships months, as well as the
months in which the African Cups of Nations and Asian Cup took
place. We also took different months of the season and public hol-
idays into account. 
4. Empirical strategy 
4.1. Selection into treatment 
We studied the effect of playing on a non-frequent day com-
pared to a frequent day on the performance of a team. Here, the
challenge for identifying a causal effect lies in the non-random de-
termination of the teams that play at home on non-frequent days.
In order to obtain an unbiased causal effect, it is essential to disen-
tangle the effect coming with the selection from the effect caused
by playing on non-frequent days. In other words, there is the need
to take selection effects into account. Decisions regarding which
teams play on which days are made by the calendar committees
of the respective leagues and might be driven by teams’ character-
istics and other schedule-related features, such as public holidays,
international breaks, TV broadcasters’ interests, European associa-
tion tournaments, etc. 24 
The rich database presented in the previous section enabled us
to opt for a selection-on-observables approach; that is, controlling
for the reasons for the deviations from random treatment assign-
ment. Having information on teams and game characteristics, Eu-
ropean cups scheduling, national teams’ tournaments, etc., enabled
us to capture all confounding factors related to team, location, and
timing to create a quasi-experimental setup. This allows us to iden-
tify the causal effect of playing on non-frequent days on perfor-
mance if there are no unobserved characteristics that simultane-
ously affect both the probability of playing on a non-frequent day
and the outcome. 
An important issue that is worth a separate discussion relates
to broadcasting issues, which may affect the allocation of games
into frequent and non-frequent days. For instance, a broadcaster
may influence the decision to allocate strategically more or less
attractive games into different days. However, it is problematic to
have a dummy variable of whether a game was broadcast or not
since it is potentially part of our treatment. We try to solve this is-
sue by capturing the selection effects, which might be partially due
to broadcasters’ interests, by controlling for a huge range of vari-
ables. Among those are the approximated strength of a team and
its popularity (in the form of teams’ values and teams’ dummies,
among many other things), as well as controls for other obliga-
tions of the teams, so as whether they play in the European tour-
naments and are therefore shifted to non-frequent days. Therefore,24 See Goossens and Spieksma (2009) for examples of different requirements the 




f a broadcaster has a preference for certain teams to play on fre-
uent or non-frequent days (or even if a team itself has such a
reference), these teams’ dummy variable will capture this poten-
ial issue. Thus, it is very likely that selection into treatment is cap-
ured by our very large set of potential control variables satisfying
he conditional independence assumption needed for credibly esti-
ating a causal effect in our study. 
Finally, it is also important to note that the share of capacity (or
n(Attendance) ) is an endogenous variable since it is an outcome
ariable that depends on the day of the game. Therefore, we do
ot include it as a covariate in our estimation, but only use it as
n outcome variable. 
.2. Estimation 
.2.1. Estimator 
In order to have a flexible approach and overcome the restric-
ive assumptions of classical statistical linear models, we used a
tatistical matching approach. More specifically, we applied the
adius-matching-on-the-propensity score estimator with bias ad-
ustment ( Lechner et al., 2011 ). 25 Not only was this estimator found
o be very competitive among a range of matching-type estimators,
ut Huber et al. (2013) also showed its superior finite sample and
obustness properties in a large-scale Empirical Monte Carlo Study.
his estimator combines the features of distance-weighted radius
atching with a bias adjustment, which removes potential biases
ue to mismatches. 26 Control observations, which are close to the
reated unit in terms of the confounding influences, can be com-
ared to the latter to obtain the treatment effect as if treated and
ontrol units were in an experimental setting. Therefore, it is cru-
ial to capture all confounding influences; we explain how we do
his in more detail below. 
.2.2. Propensity score 
The propensity score, which is the probability of playing on a
on-frequent day, condenses the information from all relevant con-
ounding variables to a one-dimensional score, determining which
bservations are similar in terms of confounding influences. In
heir pioneering work, Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) showed that
ontrolling for the propensity score removes selection bias. There-
ore, treated and non-treated observations with similar propensity
cores are compared to each other in the matching estimator. 
If the exact relation of confounding variables and the treatment
ssignment is known, the variables to include in the propensity
core estimation can be specified ad-hoc. In our case, we have a
et of 385 potentially confounding variables, in addition to the ref-
rees and teams dummies, as described in the previous section.
espite prior knowledge about the selection process, we cannot
pecify ad-hoc exactly which of the many potential confounders
o use in the propensity score estimation. Further, including every-
hing would lead to an unfeasible estimation, less precise or insta-
le estimates. Therefore, for the specification we rely on a machine
earning algorithm. 
Using machine learning for causal inference is not a trivial ex-
rcise and the literature is still under development. Since those
lgorithms are designed for prediction and not for doing infer-
nce in treatment effects estimation, we follow the approach of
elloni et al. (2014) to make machine learning algorithms useful
n this setup. Those authors suggested using the LASSO procedure
eveloped by Tibshirani (1996) as a variable selection tool,The variance is estimated as weight-based variance as described in Huber, Lech- 
er and Steinmayr (2015) , which Bodory et al. (2020) showed to lead to conserva- 
ive standard errors. 
26 Distance weighting leads to a weighting of non-treated observations within the 
adius inversely proportional to their distance to the respective treated unit. 















































































































f  wice. 27 , 28 In the first step, we selected a set of variables con-
ounding the treatment. In the second step, we selected those vari-
bles correlated with the respective outcome. 29 The reason for
his double-selection procedure, as opposed to only looking at the
reatment selection equation, is to additionally capture variables
hat are highly correlated to the outcome and mildly related to the
reatment selection. The same line of argumentation holds for only
ooking at the outcome equation. Ignoring those kinds of variables
ould lead to potentially biased results, as described in Belloni
t al. (2014) . The union of variables selected by the two separate
ASSO procedures is our final set of variables for the propensity
core estimation. We repeat this selection procedure for all of the
stimations presented in the next section. 
. Results 
.1. Pooled data 
First, our aim was to study whether playing on non-frequent
ays has an effect on performance when using the data on all
he leagues together. To accomplish this goal, we first estimated
he propensity score, based on variables that were chosen in the
ouble-selection LASSO procedure described in the previous sec-
ion. It is important to note that the purpose of the propen-
ity score estimation is purely technical, to allow the easy purg-
ng of the results from the selection effects. Therefore, the re-
pective marginal effects of the propensity score estimation can-
ot be interpreted in a causal sense, but rather in their contri-
ution to the probability of being treated. Appendix B provides
n example of one of the propensity score estimations we had to
xecute, which is the propensity score estimation for the num-
er of favorite’s points. Generally, as is already apparent from
ables 2 and 3 , selection effects are driven by team values as
ell as by schedule-related features such as public holidays and
nternational tournaments. In addition, several individual referees
nd teams were picked by the double-selection LASSO procedure.
hile Appendix B only presents the results of the propensity score
stimation for the number of points of a favorite team, a sepa-
ate propensity score estimation for each matching estimation pre-
ented in the paper is available upon request. 
In addition, we wish to show the sensitivity of our results to
he presence or absence of referees’ dummies. Such an importance
s driven by findings of Boyko et al. (2007) and Page and Page
2010) , who showed that some referees might be more affected by
he home crowd and therefore may serve as possible mediator of a
ifference in a home advantage. Therefore, we present our results
ith and without the inclusion of referees’ dummies. More specif-
cally, in the specification that includes referees’ dummies, we only
se the dummies that were chosen in the double-selection LASSO
rocedure. 
Panel A of Table 4 shows the effect of playing on four non-
requent days compared to the three frequent days by pooling all
he leagues together. We can see that when a favorite team plays
t home, the effect of playing on non-frequent days on the num-
er of points is very close to zero ( −0.029) and highly insignificant27 The LASSO procedure is a shrinking estimator, which works like an OLS estima- 
or with penalized coefficients. Penalizing the coefficients leads to variables selec- 
ion as the coefficients of not too informative covariates are forced to zero. 
28 Goller et al. (2019) compared different (machine learning and “classical” probit) 
stimation procedures for the propensity score in matching estimation and found 
he LASSO delivered the most credible results in a setup, which is comparable to 
urs, with many potentially confounding variables and a low share of treated units. 
29 Using the LASSO method requires a penalty term, which is data-driven deter- 
ined using 10-fold cross-validation. For the current analysis, we chose the penalty 












 p -val = 0.64). However, when testing the effect of playing on non-
requent days on the number of points of the favorite when an
nderdog plays at home, we find that a favorite gains 0.17 points
ignificantly more on non-frequent days than on the frequent days.
n underdog gains about 0.13 points less when hosting a game
n non-frequent compared to frequent days, making the difference
etween favorite and underdog about 0.30 points. The share of ca-
acity on non-frequent days is 3.8 percentage points less when a
avorite team plays at home and 1.8 percentage points less when
n underdog team hosts the game. Similarly, Ln(Attendance) is sig-
ificantly lower on non-frequent days. Panel B of Table 4 , where
e present the results without referees’ dummies shows a similar
attern for all the outcome variables. 
One possible concern is that our results are driven by the defi-
ition of the frequent days. As presented in Table 1 , Saturdays and
undays are the most frequently played days in all the leagues.
herefore, an alternative comparison could be between the five
idweek days to the two weekend days. In Table 5 , we present
he effect of playing on the five non-frequent days compared to the
wo frequent days (defined as 3–7 vs. 1,2 in Table 5 ). We can see
hat, as previously, there is no significant effect on teams’ points
hen a favorite team plays at home. However, when an underdog
eam plays at home, the effect on teams’ points is lower than in
he case of the 4/3 days split as presented in Table 4 (also defined
s 4–7 vs. 1,2,3 in Table 5 ). In addition, we excluded the third fre-
uent day and compared the effect of playing on the four remain-
ng weekdays compared to the two weekend days (defined as 4–7
s. 1,2 in Table 5 ). In the case of the underdog’s home advantage,
e can see that the effects are much closer to the 4/3 days split
ather than to the 5/2 days split. We also show that the third most
requent day is significantly different from days 4–7 in terms of
eams’ points (defined as 4–7 vs. 3 in Table 5 ), namely underdog
eams that play at home on the four non-frequent days gain signif-
cantly less points than when they play at home on the third most
requent day. Finally, we show that there is no significant differ-
nce in terms of points between the two weekend days and the
hird frequent day (defined as 3 vs. 1,2 in Table 5 ). These results
uggest that the third frequent day is more similar to the weekend
ays rather than to the other weekdays. 
.2. Individual leagues 
To investigate whether our results are driven by pooling the
ata, in Table 6 , we present the results for each league separately
y using the 4/3 days split. When including referees’ dummies, as
resented in Panel A, we can see that, for all the leagues and for
oth cases of home advantage, we find a lower attendance as a
hare of capacity and a lower Ln(Attendance) on non-frequent days
ompared to frequent days. When a favorite team hosts the game,
he effect of playing on non-frequent days on share of capacity
anges from 1.6 percentage points less in English Premier League
o 7.4 percentage points less in German Bundesliga 1. When look-
ng at Ln(Attendance) , we see that a reduction in attendance ranges
rom 6.5% lower attendance in English Premier League to 15.9%
ower attendance in German Bundesliga 1 on non-frequent days.
hen an underdog team hosts the game, the effect of playing on
on-frequent days on the share of capacity ranges from 3.4 per-
entage points less in the English Premier League to 5.9 percent-
ge points less in Spanish La Liga. When looking at Ln(Attendance) ,
e see that reduction in attendance ranges from 6.0% lower atten-
ance in English Premier League and French Ligue 1 to 10.2% lower
ttendance in German Bundesliga 1. Panel B of Table 6 shows a
ery similar pattern. These results replicate the finding of Krumer
nd Lechner (2018) , who also found a lower attendance in the Ger-
an Bundesliga 1. 
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Table 4 
Levels and effects of playing on four non-frequent days for all the data. 
Dependent Variables Exp. value on non-frequent days Exp. value on frequent days Effect of playing on non-frequent days P -value Common support (in %) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Panel A: Incl. Referee Dummies 
Favorite team playing home 
Favorites Points 1.911 1.940 −0.029 0.64 98.5% 
Underdogs Points 0.826 0.809 0.017 0.76 96.9% 
Share of capacity 0.745 0.783 −0.038 ∗∗∗ 0.00 93.3% 
ln(Attendance) 10.185 10.258 −0.073 ∗∗ 0.02 97.5% 
Underdog team playing home 
Favorites Points 1.499 1.329 0.170 ∗∗ 0.01 99.9% 
Underdogs Points 1.251 1.376 −0.125 ∗∗∗ 0.04 99.4% 
Share of capacity 0.775 0.793 −0.018 ∗∗ 0.05 99.9% 
ln(Attendance) 9.903 9.961 −0.058 ∗∗ 0.02 99.8% 
Panel B: Excl. Referee Dummies 
Favorite team playing home 
Favorites Points 1.916 1.935 −0.019 0.76 98.5% 
Underdogs Points 0.838 0.801 0.038 0.50 97.1% 
Share of capacity 0.745 0.782 −0.037 ∗∗∗ 0.00 93.3% 
ln(Attendance) 10.213 10.259 −0.046 ∗ 0.10 97.8% 
Underdog team playing home 
Favorites Points 1.494 1.336 0.159 ∗∗ 0.01 99.9% 
Underdogs Points 1.244 1.376 −0.132 ∗∗ 0.04 99.5% 
Share of capacity 0.780 0.795 −0.015 ∗ 0.08 99.9% 
ln(Attendance) 9.926 9.965 −0.038 ∗ 0.10 99.9% 
Notes: The results represent all of the data. Columns (1) and (2) represent the expected values for four most non-frequent and three most frequent days, respectively. Columns 
(3) and (4) report the average treatment effect and the respective P -value. Standard errors are calculated as weight-based standard errors and clustered at the season per 
league level. Column (5) states the share of observations in common support in the radius matching. ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denote the 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively. 
Table 5 
Levels and effects of different definitions of non-frequent days for all the data. 
Incl. Referee dummies Excl. Referee dummies 
Days Favorites Points Underdog Points Favorites Points Underdog Points 
Favorite team playing home 
4–7 vs. 1,2,3 −0.029 (0.64) 0.017 (0.76) −0.019 (0.76) 0.038 (0.50) 
3–7 vs. 1,2 −0.015 (0.76) 0.000 (0.99) 0.008 (0.87) 0.010 (0.87) 
4–7 vs. 1,2 −0.007 (0.91) −0.002 (0.97) −0.043 (0.50) 0.031 (0.59) 
4–7 vs. 3 −0.085 (0.35) 0.041 (0.61) −0.106 (0.35) 0.074 (0.37) 
3 vs. 1,2 0.018 (0.79) −0.005 (0.94) 0.093 (0.18) −0.033 (0.59) 
Underdog team playing home 
4–7 vs. 1,2,3 0.170 ∗∗ (0.01) −0.125 ∗∗ (0.04) 0.159 ∗∗ (0.01) −0.132 ∗∗ (0.04) 
3–7 vs. 1,2 0.137 ∗∗ (0.01) −0.116 ∗∗ (0.02) 0.111 ∗∗ (0.04) −0.104 ∗∗ (0.05) 
4–7 vs. 1,2 0.146 ∗∗ (0.01) −0.159 ∗∗ (0.01) 0.169 ∗∗ (0.01) −0.140 ∗∗ (0.01) 
4–7 vs. 3 0.215 ∗∗ (0.03) −0.256 ∗∗∗ (0.00) 0.199 ∗∗ (0.04) −0.216 ∗∗ (0.03) 
3 vs. 1,2 0.051 (0.50) −0.040 (0.59) 0.085 (0.26) −0.063 (0.40) 
Notes: The results represent the effects of playing on different definitions of non-frequent days 
for all the data. The most frequent day is defined as day 1 and the least frequent day is defined 
as day 7. P -values of the effects are presented in parentheses. Standard errors are calculated as 
weight-based standard errors and clustered at the seasonal level. ∗ , ∗∗ , and ∗∗∗ denote the 10%, 


























30 See, for example, https://www.sportskeeda.com/slideshow/ 
football- most- biased- referees-top-teams-premier-league . Last accessed on When using referees dummies, as presented in Panel A of
Table 6 , in all the leagues apart from Bundesliga 1, playing on non-
frequent days has no effect on the home advantage of the favorite
teams. However, in all the four leagues there is a reduced home
advantage on non-frequent days for the underdog teams. Our re-
sults suggest that the difference in the number of points between
the favorite and the underdog teams, when the game takes place
on non-frequent days compared to frequent days, is 0.49 in Ligue
1, 0.43 in La Liga, 0.42 in Premier League, and 0.63 in Bundesliga
1. This difference is quite large given that, in our dataset, a favorite
with home advantage gains on average about 1.1 points more than
the underdog. In addition, in a tight league, one point could make
the difference between relegation and survival or between qual-
ification to the UEFA Champions League and the less prestigious
UEFA Europa League. 0Interestingly, when excluding referees’ dummies, as presented
n Panel B of Table 6 , we find no significant effect of playing on
on-frequent days in the Premier League. This result may suggest
hat certain referees may serve as possible mediators of a reduced
ome advantage of an underdog team on non-frequent days, which
s in line with the findings in Boyko et al. (2007) and Page and
age (2010) , who described the existence of individual differences
mong referees in terms of the home advantage. This is also in line
ith the recent speculations that some referees have a reputation
or being biased in favor or against specific teams in the English
remier League. 30 2.11.2019. 
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Table 6 
Levels and effects of playing on four non-frequent days for each league separately. 
Outcomes Ligue 1 La Liga Premier League Bundesliga 1 Wald Test ( p -value) 
Panel A: Incl. Referee Dummies 
Favorite team playing home 
Favorites Points −0.062(0.62) 0.015(0.89) −0.093(0.43) −0.276(0.10) 0.55 
Underdogs Points −0.064(0.57) 0.135(0.15) −0.046(0.65) 0.310 ∗(0.06) 0.17 
Share of capacity −0.042 ∗(0.10) −0.066 ∗∗∗(0.00) −0.016 ∗(0.06) −0.074 ∗∗∗(0.00) 0.00 
Ln(Attendance) −0.102 ∗(0.07) −0.116 ∗∗(0.03) −0.065 ∗(0.06) −0.159 ∗∗∗(0.00) 0.50 
Underdog team playing home 
Favorites Points 0.228 ∗(0.07) 0.242 ∗∗(0.02) 0.225 ∗∗(0.05) 0.329 ∗∗(0.05) 0.96 
Underdogs Points −0.266 ∗∗(0.05) −0.188 ∗(0.06) −0.197 ∗(0.07) −0.303 ∗(0.06) 0.91 
Share of capacity −0.036 ∗∗(0.05) −0.059 ∗∗∗(0.00) −0.034 ∗∗∗(0.00) −0.036 ∗∗(0.02) 0.44 
Ln(Attendance) −0.060 ∗(0.09) −0.073 ∗(0.07) −0.060 ∗∗(0.03) −0.102 ∗∗(0.04) 0.90 
Panel B: Excl. Referee Dummies 
Favorite team playing home 
Favorites Points 0.118(0.33) 0.021(0.85) 0.019(0.87) −0.230(0.20) 0.46 
Underdogs Points −0.088(0.44) 0.030(0.74) −0.053(0.60) 0.496 ∗∗∗(0.00) 0.02 
Share of capacity −0.043 ∗∗(0.05) −0.065 ∗∗∗(0.00) −0.016 ∗(0.09) −0.081 ∗∗∗(0.00) 0.00 
Ln(Attendance) −0.121 ∗∗(0.03) −0.158 ∗∗∗(0.00) −0.063 ∗(0.05) −0.097 ∗(0.08) 0.44 
Underdog team playing home 
Favorites Points 0.294 ∗(0.07) 0.204 ∗∗(0.04) 0.078(0.47) 0.410 ∗∗(0.01) 0.36 
Underdogs Points −0.407 ∗∗∗(0.00) −0.310 ∗∗∗(0.00) 0.032(0.75) −0.305 ∗∗(0.05) 0.07 
Share of capacity −0.034 ∗(0.05) −0.041 ∗∗∗(0.00) −0.034 ∗∗∗(0.00) −0.059 ∗∗∗(0.00) 0.62 
Ln(Attendance) −0.065(0.12) −0.088 ∗∗(0.02) −0.050 ∗(0.08) −0.103 ∗∗(0.03) 0.75 
Notes: The results represent the effects of playing on four non-frequent days compared to the three most frequent days for 
each league separately. P -values of the effects are presented in parentheses. Standard errors are calculated as weight-based 
standard errors and clustered at the seasonal level. ∗ , ∗∗ , and ∗∗∗ denote the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively. 

































































o  Furthermore, we conducted a WALD test for the equality of
ach estimate obtained in the analyses for the single leagues. More
pecifically, we tested the hypothesis that the effects are equal for
ll the leagues and reported the p-values from the resulting chi
quare test statistic in the last column of Table 6 . We found that
he effects are not statistically different between the leagues for
he favorites and underdogs points (except for underdog points
ithout referees’ dummies), or for the Ln(Attendance). Although
he only robust significant difference between the leagues is for
he share of capacity in the case when a favorite team plays at
ome, this emphasizes the need to conduct the analysis for each
eague separately. 
.3. Robustness tests 
Despite our findings presented in Table 5 that on the aggre-
ate level, the third frequent day is likely to resemble the two
eekend days, we nevertheless conduct separate analyses for the
/2 days split for each league separately. The results in Table 7
how a similar pattern as with 4/3 days split presented in Table 6 ,
hough not always significant at conventional level. More specifi-
ally, we find that the share of capacity in case when an underdog
lays at home is always negative and significant for all the leagues
ith and without referees’ dummies. These results are in line with
he findings of Buraimo (2008) , Buraimo and Simmons (2015) , and
orrest and Simmons (2006) , all of whom reported that weekend
ames attract larger crowds and larger TV ratings in the English
remier League. However, Ln(Attendance) is sensitive to inclusion
f referees’ dummies in Ligue 1 and also not significant in three
ut of four cases in the Bundesliga 1, but confirms the general pic-
ure. In addition, we can see a higher number of points for the fa-
orite team (lower number of points for the underdog team) when
nderdog team plays at home, however with a lower magnitude
ompared to the results in Table 6 . When including referees’ dum-ies, the results are significant for La Liga and Bundesliga 1, and
re in similar direction as with the 4/3 days split, but with p -val
n the range between 0.14 and 0.17 in Ligue 1 and Premier League.
hen excluding the referees’ dummies, as presented in Panel B of
able 7 , the Premier League has a zero effect, which is in line with
he results presented in Panel B of Table 6 . The results in Ligue 1
nd La Liga are just insignificant with p-val in the range between
.11 and 0.14. 
Finally, as previously, we excluded the third frequent day and
ested the effect of playing on four non-frequent days versus the
wo most frequently played days. Table 8 presents the results,
here we can see that the share of capacity is always negative
nd significant, and Ln(Attendance) is not significant for Ligue 1
ithout referees’ dummies and for one case in the Premier League.
hen excluding the third most frequent day in Bundesliga 1 (Fri-
ay), the Ln(Attendance) became significant again, suggesting that
riday is much more similar to Saturday and Sunday than to the
ther weekdays. Finally, the effects on teams’ points when the un-
erdog team plays at home are much larger and more significant
han in the 5/2 days split, presented in Table 7 . As already dis-
ussed, these results suggest again that the third most frequent day
s more associated with the weekend games rather than with mid-
eek games, and therefore we refer to the 4/3 days split as to our
referred specification. 
. Discussion 
Our finding regarding the lower home advantage of the under-
og on non-frequent days is in line with the literature on the ef-
ect of the density of the crowd and its noise on referees’ bias in
avor of the home team ( Downward & Jones, 2007 ; Nevill et al.,
002 ; Page & Page, 2010 ; Pettersson-Lidbom & Priks, 2010 ). There-
ore, a possible mediator of the difference in the home advantage
f the underdog teams in games that take place on non-frequent
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Table 7 
Levels and Effects of playing on five non-frequent days for each league separately. 
Outcomes Ligue 1 La Liga Premier League Bundesliga 1 Wald Test ( p -value) 
Panel A: Incl. Referee Dummies 
Favorite team playing home 
Favorites Points −0.095(0.34) 0.043(0.64) −0.010(0.92) −0.045(0.68) 0.78 
Underdogs Points 0.043(0.63) −0.031(0.71) 0.114(0.16) −0.048(0.64) 0.48 
Share of capacity −0.030 ∗(0.06) −0.060 ∗∗∗(0.00) −0.016 ∗∗(0.02) −0.031 ∗∗(0.01) 0.02 
Ln(Attendance) −0.084 ∗(0.07) −0.125 ∗∗∗(0.00) −0.039(0.14) −0.055(0.12) 0.36 
Underdog team playing home 
Favorites Points 0.151(0.17) 0.154 ∗(0.10) 0.148(0.15) 0.274 ∗∗(0.02) 0.83 
Underdogs Points −0.150(0.15) −0.227 ∗∗(0.01) −0.143(0.14) −0.236 ∗∗(0.04) 0.87 
Share of capacity −0.025 ∗(0.09) −0.070 ∗∗∗(0.00) −0.037 ∗∗∗(0.00) −0.028 ∗∗(0.02) 0.06 
Ln(Attendance) −0.054 ∗(0.09) −0.110 ∗∗∗(0.00) −0.074 ∗∗∗(0.00) −0.054(0.14) 0.67 
Panel B: Excl. Referee Dummies 
Favorite team playing home 
Favorites Points −0.018(0.86) 0.020(0.83) −0.002(0.98) 0.006(0.96) 0.99 
Underdogs Points 0.114(0.20) −0.099(0.23) −0.047(0.59) −0.046(0.66) 0.33 
Share of capacity −0.033 ∗∗(0.03) −0.065 ∗∗∗(0.00) −0.018 ∗∗(0.01) −0.029 ∗∗(0.01) 0.01 
Ln(Attendance) −0.053(0.28) −0.097 ∗∗(0.03) −0.047 ∗(0.07) −0.060 ∗(0.07) 0.81 
Underdog team playing home 
Favorites Points 0.153(0.14) 0.155(0.11) −0.008(0.94) 0.331 ∗∗∗(0.00) 0.24 
Underdogs Points −0.198 ∗(0.06) −0.143(0.13) 0.028(0.77) −0.202 ∗(0.08) 0.32 
Share of capacity −0.043 ∗∗∗(0.00) −0.054 ∗∗∗(0.00) −0.035 ∗∗∗(0.00) −0.020 ∗(0.08) 0.20 
Ln(Attendance) −0.027(0.41) −0.125 ∗∗∗(0.00) −0.073 ∗∗∗(0.00) −0.033(0.32) 0.15 
Notes: The results represent the effects of playing on five non-frequent days compared to the two most frequent days for 
each league separately P -values of the effects are presented in parentheses. Standard errors are calculated as weight-based 
standard errors and clustered at the seasonal level. ∗ , ∗∗ , and ∗∗∗ denote the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively. 
Common support for each of the matching estimations is at least 92.8% (Ligue 1), 93.4% (La Liga), 89.5% (Premier League), 
and 94.6% (Bundesliga). 
Table 8 
Levels and Effects excluding the third most frequent day for each league separately. 
Outcomes Ligue 1 La Liga Premier League Bundesliga 1 Wald Test ( p -value) 
Panel A: Incl. Referee Dummies 
Favorite team playing home 
Favorites Points −0.000(1.00) −0.038(0.72) 0.052(0.67) −0.311 ∗(0.07) 0.36 
Underdogs Points −0.052(0.65) 0.040(0.69) −0.082(0.45) 0.311 ∗(0.05) 0.20 
Share of capacity −0.045 ∗(0.06) −0.067 ∗∗∗(0.00) −0.018 ∗∗(0.02) −0.094 ∗∗∗(0.00) 0.00 
Ln(Attendance) −0.107 ∗(0.09) −0.103 ∗∗(0.04) −0.060 ∗(0.06) −0.124 ∗∗(0.02) 0.70 
Underdog team playing home 
Favorites Points 0.270 ∗(0.09) 0.155(0.15) 0.195 ∗(0.09) 0.302 ∗(0.08) 0.87 
Underdogs Points −0.301 ∗∗(0.03) −0.257 ∗∗(0.01) −0.176 ∗(0.10) −0.315 ∗∗(0.05) 0.85 
Share of capacity −0.050 ∗∗∗(0.00) −0.060 ∗∗∗(0.00) −0.037 ∗∗∗(0.00) −0.032 ∗∗(0.04) 0.46 
Ln(Attendance) −0.069 ∗(0.08) −0.104 ∗∗∗(0.00) −0.067 ∗∗(0.02) −0.083 ∗(0.10) 0.86 
Panel B: Excl. Referee Dummies 
Favorite team playing home 
Favorites Points 0.095(0.47) −0.090(0.39) −0.007(0.95) −0.221(0.19) 0.48 
Underdogs Points −0.112(0.31) −0.085(0.36) −0.060(0.56) 0.346 ∗∗(0.05) 0.13 
Share of capacity −0.056 ∗∗(0.01) −0.063 ∗∗∗(0.00) −0.019 ∗∗(0.04) −0.092 ∗∗∗(0.00) 0.00 
Ln(Attendance) −0.093(0.11) −0.158 ∗∗∗(0.00) −0.053(0.12) −0.111 ∗∗(0.04) 0.35 
Underdog team playing home 
Favorites Points 0.329 ∗∗(0.04) 0.266 ∗∗(0.01) −0.046(0.67) 0.482 ∗∗∗(0.00) 0.03 
Underdogs Points −0.378 ∗∗(0.01) −0.311 ∗∗∗(0.00) −0.004(0.97) −0.293 ∗(0.07) 0.10 
Share of capacity −0.049 ∗∗∗(0.00) −0.043 ∗∗∗(0.00) −0.033 ∗∗∗(0.00) −0.051 ∗∗∗(0.00) 0.68 
Ln(Attendance) −0.049(0.24) −0.093 ∗∗(0.01) −0.054 ∗(0.06) −0.099 ∗(0.06) 0.74 
Notes: The results represent the effects of playing on four most non-frequent days compared to the two most frequent days, 
excluding the third most frequent day, for each league separately. P -values of the effects are presented in parentheses. Stan- 
dard errors are calculated as weight-based standard errors and clustered at the seasonal level. ∗ , ∗∗ , and ∗∗∗ denote the 10%, 
5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively. Common support for each of the matching estimations is at least 87.3% (Ligue 1), 
92.5% (La Liga), 91.4% (Premier League), and 83.2% (Bundesliga). 



































































































ays is lower crowd noise compared to games on frequent days.
rowd noise might be lower on non-frequent days not only due to
ower attendance, but also magnified by a lower amount of alco-
ol consumption on non-frequent days. In addition, if a crowd is
ess passionate and supportive on non-frequent days, this may also
egatively affect players’ motivation, which may result in lower
erformance. 
Another possible explanation to the lower home advantage of
he underdog on non-frequent days relates to the literature on pre-
erformance routine. Previous research has suggested that having
he usual pre-performance routine has a positive relationship with
erformance in sports. This may be due to lowered anxiety, in-
reased task-relevant focus or reduced negative self-assessment.
or example, Mesagno and Mullane-Grant (2010) showed that
sual pre-performance routine helped Australian football players
erforming better under increased pressure. Similarly, Lonsdale
nd Tam (2008) demonstrated that NBA basketball players’ free
hrow shooting was better if they followed their dominant be-
avioral sequence. 31 In that spirit it is possible that players of
he home team have a different pre-performance routine on non-
requent day (for example, different within family routine, different
raffic before the game, different media coverage, etc.), which may
egatively affect their anxiety and self-efficacy levels. In that re-
ard, away teams are less exposed to negative effects of deviating
rom their routine, since they are not in their usual settings any-
ay, and therefore prepare to that game in the usual away game
outine. 
One possible explanation for the finding that the home advan-
age of the favorite teams is not affected by the day of the game
s that these teams are likely to win because of their higher abil-
ties, regardless of home support or pre-performance routine. This
ould suggest that underdog teams depend more on crowd sup-
ort or some other psychological factors than favorite teams. The
egative effect on the home advantage of the favorite in Bun-
esliga 1 may be explained by the fact that this league differs from
he other leagues as it has 18 teams, not 20. In addition, accord-
ng to Yi et al. (2020) , Bundesliga 1 has the most reliable league
chedule, with the lowest number of rescheduled games and a
igher quality realized schedule than the other leagues. Indeed, as
able 1 shows, Bundesliga 1 has the lowest amount of games on
on-frequent days. In addition, as already mentioned, Bundesliga
 has the highest reduction of attendance among all the leagues
n the 4/3 days split when a favorite team plays at home (15.9%
ess attendance). This suggests that fans are not used to attending
he stadium on non-frequent days and also that the players of the
avorite teams may be less motivated to play in front of smaller
rowds that are also likely to be less supportive on non-frequent
ays. 
. Conclusion 
According to Wright (2014) , the main objective of his survey
n operational research in sports was fairness, which is probably31 For additional references on the effect of pre-performance routine on perfor- 
ance, see a recent study of Wergin et al. (2020) . ne of the most important features in sports competitions. In the
ontext of scheduling of the soccer leagues, a schedule would be
onsidered fair if ex-ante all teams have the same probability to
onvert the home advantage into success, given their individual
haracteristics, regardless of the day of the game. In this regard,
ur findings suggest that in all four leagues that we investigated
Bundesliga 1, La Liga, Premier League and Ligue 1), we find that
he current schedule structure favors underdog teams that play
ewer home games on non-frequent days and favorite teams that
lay more away games on these days. However, at least in the
remier League, the possible mediator may be a referee bias in
avor or against certain teams. Therefore, our results may be of
nterest to the referees’ committee whose goal is to reduce any
ias. 
Our results also suggest that all four leagues suffer from lower
ttendance rates on non-frequent days. Therefore, our findings may
lso be of interest to the calendar committees of the relevant
eagues, whose task is to allocate games in a way that eliminates
ny advantage driven by schedule. More specifically, it is impor-
ant that home games on non-frequent days are allocated evenly
n the level of a single team per season. Having said that, we
re aware that the calendar committees have to deal with a large
mount of constraints, such that it is sometimes almost impossi-
le to satisfy all of them. On top of it, schedule effects that might
rive a referee bias should be a big concern for the referees’ com-
ittees rather than for calendar committees. However, the case of
.FSV Mainz 05 that was mentioned in the introduction provides
n example where the calendar committee disregarded the issue
f fair allocation between different days. Furthermore, our findings
ight be worth an additional restriction, not only in constructing
he initial schedule, but also for implementing proactive or reac-
ive strategies for rescheduled games, as Yi et al. (2020) recently
roposed. 
In addition, the results of this paper may also help coaches
nd players prepare to play on different days. According to our
esults, underdog teams may be expected to have a lower home
dvantage on non-frequent days and should therefore consider ad-
usting their preparation to these games. Furthermore, teams may
djust their ticket sales strategy. For example, tickets for games
n non-frequent days, for which there is less demand, could be
old for a lower price to attract larger crowds and increase home
dvantage. 
Finally, we call for additional empirical research on different
chedule effects in sports leagues that may potentially affect on-
itch performance as well as financial outcomes. 
ppendix A: Descriptive statistics 
Table A.1 . 
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Table A.1 
Descriptive statistics for all available variables. 
Favorite playing home Underdog playing home 
Variable Frequent days non-frequent days Frequent days non-frequent days 
Game Outcomes 
Favorite points 1.930 1.981 1.333 1.575 
Underdog points 0.817 0.784 1.391 1.144 
Favorite win 0.559 0.582 0.352 0.432 
Underdog win 0.188 0.183 0.371 0.288 
Game Characteristics 
Stadium capacity 40,825 44,864 29,924 31,410 
Visitors 32,743 34,583 24,031 24,943 
Share of capacity 0.781 0.750 0.792 0.794 
Ln(Attendance) 10.242 10.292 9.955 10.005 
Distance 487.502 501.569 485.106 461.455 
Teams Characteristics 
Fav. team value (in mill. €) 147.424 194.466 148.308 204.742 
Und. team value (in mill. €) 63.947 73.319 64.615 78.651 
Fav. standardized team value 0.218 0.464 0.228 0.510 
Und. standardized team value −0.577 −0.508 −0.570 −0.515 
Fav. mean value (in mill. €) 4.389 5.635 4.407 5.893 
Und. mean value (in mill. €) 1.933 2.209 1.955 2.336 
Fav. median value (in mill. €) 2.999 3.738 3.012 3.964 
Und. median value (in Mill €) 1.473 1.632 1.479 1.760 
Fav. ratio of top 3 to ranked 9 −11 most valuable players 2.410 2.492 2.408 2.469 
Und. ratio of top 3 to ranked 9 −11 most valuable players 2.330 2.403 2.332 2.381 
Fav. plays in Champions League or Europa League 0.331 0.455 0.340 0.440 
Und. plays in Champions League or Europa League 0.086 0.127 0.084 0.108 
Fav. plays in Europa League 0.176 0.221 0.183 0.211 
Und. plays in Europa League 0.070 0.112 0.066 0.083 
Fav. plays in Champions League 0.184 0.290 0.188 0.281 
Und. plays in Champions League 0.023 0.026 0.024 0.041 
Newcomer 0.046 0.054 0.292 0.242 
Fav. coaches age 49.280 49.708 49.325 49.917 
Und. coaches age 48.422 48.815 48.446 49.110 
Fav. first match with new coach 0.024 0.018 0.027 0.014 
Und. first match with new coach 0.024 0.011 0.021 0.021 
Fav. second match with new coach 0.025 0.021 0.023 0.021 
Und. second match with new coach 0.023 0.039 0.025 0.023 
Teams Characteristics 
Fav. third match with new coach 0.022 0.019 0.024 0.020 
Und. third match with new coach 0.024 0.016 0.025 0.023 
Fav. fourth match with new coach 0.021 0.025 0.021 0.036 
Und. fourth match with new coach 0.020 0.023 0.021 0.027 
Fav. fifth match with new coach 0.023 0.035 0.024 0.032 
Und. fifth match with new coach 0.016 0.026 0.019 0.032 
Fav. size of squad 33.363 34.186 33.384 34.561 
Und. size of squad 32.753 32.889 32.704 33.286 
Fav. number of foreigners 17.525 17.427 17.540 18.078 
Und. number of foreigners 15.822 15.202 15.886 16.089 
Fav. share of foreigners 0.520 0.503 0.520 0.515 
Und. share of foreigners 0.478 0.457 0.479 0.476 
Fav. share right-footed 0.696 0.692 0.696 0.680 
Und. share right-footed 0.694 0.709 0.695 0.695 
Fav. share left-footed 0.213 0.206 0.212 0.219 
Und. share left-footed 0.222 0.218 0.219 0.225 
Fav. share both-footed 0.073 0.084 0.073 0.089 
Und. share both-footed 0.061 0.054 0.063 0.063 
Fav. mean height (in centimeter) 181.816 181.453 181.785 181.677 
Und. mean height (in centimeter) 181.778 181.534 181.786 181.534 
Fav. min height (in centimeter) 171.736 171.170 171.715 171.391 
Und. min height (in centimeter) 172.026 171.525 171.982 171.666 
Fav. max height (in centimeter) 191.623 191.817 191.586 191.933 
Und. max height (in centimeter) 191.005 191.111 191.039 191.206 
Fav. std.dev. height 6.288 6.562 6.295 6.520 
Und. std.dev. height 5.986 6.116 6.003 6.147 
Fav. HHI 0.060 0.061 0.060 0.060 
Und. HHI 0.058 0.059 0.058 0.058 
Fav. std.dev. HHI 0.031 0.032 0.031 0.032 
Und. std.dev. HHI 0.028 0.029 0.028 0.029 
( continued on next page ) 
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Table A.1 ( continued ) 
Favorite playing home Underdog playing home 
Variable Frequent days non-frequent days Frequent days non-frequent days 
Fav. ratio of top 3 to ranked 12 −14 most valuable player 3.065 3.181 3.065 3.135 
Und. ratio of top 3 to ranked 12 −14 most valuable player 2.927 3.044 2.926 3.002 
Fav. ratio of top 11 to ranked 12 −23 most valuable player 2.879 2.939 2.881 2.879 
Und. ratio of top 11 to ranked 12 −23 most valuable player 2.704 2.779 2.702 2.690 
Teams Characteristics 
Fav. median age 23.896 23.927 23.890 23.915 
Und. median age 24.356 24.502 24.360 24.571 
Fav. mean age 24.258 24.282 24.250 24.265 
Und. mean age 24.663 24.762 24.666 24.813 
Fav. std.dev. age 4.470 4.502 4.477 4.533 
Und. std.dev. age 4.453 4.430 4.455 4.434 
Fav. mean age 11 most valuable player 25.868 25.825 25.878 25.780 
Und. mean age 11 most valuable player 26.106 26.024 26.118 26.027 
Fav. age ratio of top 11 to ranked 12 −23 most valuable players 1.006 1.000 1.006 0.995 
Und. age ratio of top 11 to ranked 12 −23 most valuable players 1.003 0.994 1.003 0.994 
Fav. mean age if aged above 20 26.069 26.111 26.076 26.151 
Und. mean age if aged above 20 26.239 26.265 26.240 26.297 
Fav. min age 17.239 17.146 17.225 17.091 
Und. min age 17.401 17.420 17.413 17.414 
Fav. max age 34.232 34.330 34.239 34.433 
Und. max age 34.455 34.591 34.501 34.671 
Schedule-related 
African Cup of Nations 0.066 0.023 0.066 0.037 
Asian Cup 0.022 0.009 0.021 0.007 
Public holiday 0.035 0.091 0.035 0.091 
Christmas holiday (24.12. −01.01.) 0.015 0.095 0.015 0.105 
After international break 0.123 0.035 0.116 0.048 
Before UEFA European Championship 0.064 0.084 0.063 0.073 
After UEFA European Championship 0.042 0.065 0.041 0.048 
Before FIFA World Cup 0.040 0.039 0.044 0.027 
After FIFA World Cup 0.028 0.049 0.028 0.044 
Observations 4462 569 4548 563 
Notes: This table presents average values for all available variables from all league combined for the three most frequent and four non-frequent days. Und. and Fav. represent 




Table B.1 ( continued ) 
Variables Favorite playing Underdog ppendix B: Propensity score estimation Table B.1 . 
able B.1 
stimation of propensity score. 




Schedule and match characteristics 
Season 2009/10 −0.029 ∗
Season 2013/14 0.027 ∗
Season 2014/15 0.044 ∗∗∗ 0.035 ∗∗
Season 2015/16 0.031 ∗∗ 0.055 ∗∗∗
Ligue 1 −0.056 ∗∗ −0.068 ∗∗∗
Premier League 0.045 ∗∗
March 0.011 
August −0.065 ∗∗∗ −0.082 ∗∗∗
November −0.034 ∗
After international break −0.104 ∗∗∗
Public holiday 0.103 ∗∗∗ 0.085 ∗∗∗
Referee 28 0.131 
Referee 125 −0.042 
Referee 178 −0.011 
Referee 220 0.105 
Team characteristics 
Fav. standardized team value 0.007 0.016 
Und. standardized team value 0.046 ∗∗ 0.045 ∗
Underdog team value (in mill. €) −0.000 −0.000 
Favorite average team value (in mill. 
€) 
−0.004 0.003 
Fav. std.dev. team value (in mill. €) 0.006 
home playing home 
Und. ratio of value of top 3 to ranked 
9 −11 most valuable players 
0.007 
Und. ratio of value of top 11 to ranked 
12 −21 most valuable players 
−0.005 
Und. Athletic Bilbao −0.009 
Und. Getafe CF 0.039 
Und. EA Guingamp −0.020 
Und. RC Mallorca 0.014 
Fav. OG Nice 0.042 
Und. VfB Stuttgart 0.016 
Und. Deportivo Alaves −0.001 
Fav. Tottenham Hotspurs −0.044 
Und. Xerez CD −0.048 
Und. Eintracht Frankfurt 0.042 
Fav. UD Las Palmas 0.157 
Fav. Manchester United −0.045 
Und. Manchester United 0.235 ∗
Und. Ajaccio GFCO −0.033 
Fav. Cordoba CF 0.113 
Fav. plays in Europa League 0.026 ∗∗
Und. plays in Europa League 0.020 
Und. plays in Champions League −0.056 ∗ −0.000 
Und. std.dev. height of 11 most 
valuable players 
0.005 
Fav. age of 11 most valuable players −0.001 −0.003 
( continued on next page ) 
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Und. maximum height of 11 most 
valuable players 
−0.002 
Und. coach age 0.001 0.001 ∗∗
Fav. squad size 0.006 ∗∗∗
Fav. number of foreigners in squad −0.003 ∗∗
Und. share of foreigners −0.086 ∗∗ −0.061 ∗
Number of observations 5031 5111 
Notes: Dependent variable is whether a game is played on one of the four non- 
frequent days. Probit average marginal effects are presented. The results are based 
on the union of variables selected by the two-step LASSO variable selection for play- 
ing on non-frequent days and the number of favorites’ points. Und. and Fav. repre- 
sent the underdog and favorite teams, respectively. ∗ , ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ represent the 10%, 





















































































Appendix C: List of sources for database 
www.uefa.com www.fifa.com www.transfermarkt.com
www.football-data.co.uk www.rsssf.com www.espnfc.com www.
fcal.ch https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bundesliga www.weltfussball.
com www.google.com/maps www.kicker.de 
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